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Protecting Against International Infringements in the
Digital Age Using United States Copyright Law: A
Critical Analysis of the Current State of the Law
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the Internet and its exploding use in the past
few years, intellectual property protections have advanced to the
forefront of conversation, litigation, and legislation as governments,
businesses, and consumers strive to protect intellectual property
while maintaining the independence of the end user in this new
technological revolution. Of particular concern is the freedom and
mobility the Internet has brought to software producers, consumers,
and software piraters. Intellectual property protections that traditionally afforded adequate protection prior to the Internet revolution
may, in some circumstances, inadequately protect certain types of intellectual property.1 Software is of particular concern; by its nature
software is easily copied without affecting the original or altering the
software’s functionality.
Copyright law, by its territorial nature, does not adequately protect copyright owners’ interests in an international context.2 An individual who has been afforded a certain degree of copyright protection in the United States is not guaranteed protection against
copyright infringements that may occur abroad, even though the
copyright holder and the copyright infringer are U.S. citizens.3 Certain doctrines like contributory infringement and vicarious liability
serve to deter extraterritorial would-be copyright infringers. Due to
territorial limitations on U.S. law, however, these doctrines fall woefully short because U.S. courts cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over wholly foreign infringements, even though the infringement may be perpetrated by a U.S. entity.4 The territorial
limitation on copyright restricts a court’s ability to find subject mat1. See, e.g., infra Part II.
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See id.
4. See infra Parts III–IV. The courts have come to different conclusions regarding this
principle with respect to the “to authorize” language of 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001).
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ter jurisdiction, although a court may easily exercise personal jurisdiction.5 Some courts have attempted to combat the subject matter
jurisdiction question by finding that mere “authorization” in the
United States of an extraterritorial infringing act constitutes actionable infringement,6 while other courts have maintained that “authorization” will not extend the application of copyright law to
wholly foreign infringements.7 One court explained the “authorization” problem this way: “Under [the current] view, a phone call to
Nebraska results in liability; the same phone call to France results in
riches. In a global marketplace, it is literally a distinction without a
difference.”8 In short, depending on a court’s interpretation, the
court may choose to interpret expansively subject matter based on
copyright law to extend to extraterritorial infringements, or the court
may seek to limit copyright subject matter’s application by requiring
a territorial copyright violation. The question is which view better
purports to promote the copyright policies outlined by the legislative
branch.
This Comment seeks to address the problem of protecting copyrighted works from infringements occurring abroad. Currently, certain mechanisms exist to extend copyright protection to extraterritorial infringing acts, but those protective extensions of copyright law
are limited in scope and rarely avail the copyright owner adequate legal protection in foreign jurisdictions. An expansive treatment of
copyright law, as opposed to restricting copyright’s extraterritorial
application, can ensure that the copyright holder may litigate his
claim domestically under U.S. copyright law. Litigating in the
United States will reduce the cost of copyright enforcement, ensure a
better incentive for the creation of copyrighted works, add certainty
to the law, and protect the United States’ investment in its intellectual property.
Part II provides a background to the problem and defines the extraterritorial enforcement problem, including identifying copyright
law’s territorial limitations and the effect of those limitations on preventing copyright infringements abroad. This section also explores a
limited number of situations where infringements abroad may be ac-

5.
6.
7.
8.
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tionable under U.S. law. Part III investigates the dichotomy between
recent court cases and the respective courts’ interpretations of the
copyright statute to infringements authorized domestically but occurring abroad. Part IV outlines the current state of copyright law
with respect to application of foreign law to the extraterritorial infringements in both U.S. and foreign courts. This paper concludes
by suggesting that, due to the Internet revolution and the ease of
copying protected works, U.S. courts should interpret copyright expansively to afford a greater amount of protection to the copyrights
of U.S. nationals.
II. BACKGROUND
Copyright law provides certain monopolistic protections based
on the nature of the underlying work. The protections provided by
copyright differ fundamentally from intellectual property safeguards
in patent law, offering protection for copyrightable “expression,” not
“ideas;”9 however, in spite of the fundamental differences in protection offered by the two areas of law, courts have looked for assistance
in patent law when determining how to apply copyright law in uncharted territory.10 As with patent law, copyright law does not extend
to most extraterritorial infringing acts; the law restricts actionable
copyright infringements to domestic violations.11 This extraterritorial
restriction affects the ability of U.S. nationals to enforce their copyright “rights” against other entities that may extraterritorially infringe the copyright holders’ works, especially where the United
States has an interest in protecting its citizens’ intellectual property.
Supplemental doctrines of vicarious liability and contributory infringement serve to extend copyright law’s territorial bounds.

A. Extraterritorial Application of Copyright Law
Courts deciding copyright infringement cases have looked not
only to copyright law to solve infringement questions but also to
patent law because of the similarities between the two.12
Understanding extraterritorial application of copyright law also
9. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.
10. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.A; see also infra Part III (explaining particular doctrines and situations where the courts have found that exercising subject matter jurisdiction over certain foreign copyright infringements is within the “territorial” restrictions placed on copyright).
12. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (stat-
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standing extraterritorial application of copyright law also requires
some understanding of the extraterritorial application of patent law.
Patent law protects ideas “reduc[ed] to practice,”13 not expression
fixed in a “tangible medium,”14 so the net protections afforded to
the two types of intellectual property differ in scope, and the restriction on patent is limited to concrete applications of ideas; copyright
law protects expressions, not ideas.
The territorial scope of patent and copyright are similar in that
the territorial limitations on the two areas of law are premised on the
same principle that laws passed by Congress are limited to the territorial boundaries of the United States, unless otherwise provided by
statute or in congressional intent.15 This limitation adversely affects
copyright owners’ rights when the courts will not recognize subject
matter jurisdiction over a defendant over whom the court may validly exercise personal jurisdiction.
The scope of copyright law is restricted to protecting works
within the territorial limitation of U.S. laws by providing a cause of
action for domestic infringements of protected works. Copyright law
reserves a limited number of exclusive rights in copyright for the
creator of “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”16 The exclusive rights listed in section 10617 of
the Copyright Act do not explicitly restrict the scope of the copy-

ing that “[t]he closest analogy [to copyright] is provided by the patent law cases to which it is
appropriate to refer because of the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.”);
see also id. n.19 (noting that patent and copyright are not completely identical: “The two areas
of the law, naturally, are not twins, and we exercise the caution which we have expressed in the
past in applying doctrine formulated in one area to the other.”).
13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 112 (1994).
14. 17 U.S.C § 102 (1994).
15. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); infra note 25 and accompanying text.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). Section 106 provides the copyright owner the “exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following:”
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work . . .
(2) to prepare derivative works . . .
(3) to distribute copies . . .
(4) . . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) . . . to display the copyrighted work publicly . . .
(6) . . . to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
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right monopoly within the territorial limits of the United States.18
Section 501,19 which outlines a cause of action for copyright infringement, also makes no mention of the territoriality requirement.20
In United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co.,21 the Supreme Court held that copyright law does not apply extraterritorially.22 The issue was whether, under the Copyright Act of 1905, the
notice requirement extended to copies of a published work distributed abroad.23 Justice Holmes, speaking for the majority, indicated
that copyright law does not extend extraterritorially and stated that
the “notice is necessary only in ‘all copies of such books sold or distributed in the United States.’”24 The Supreme Court found that
Congress had implicitly included territoriality in the statute. Congress has seemingly acquiesced, as it has not legislatively overturned
the Supreme Court’s ruling in United Dictionary.
Apart from copyright law, the Supreme Court has more recently
reemphasized the presumption against extraterritorial extension of
U.S. law unless the particular statute includes a provision for the
statute’s extraterritorial application or congressional intent specifically indicates that the particular law should be applied outside the
territorial limitations of the United States.25 Although the Supreme
Court has not recently ruled directly on the issue of extraterritorial
enforcement of copyright law, many courts have continued to hold
that U.S. copyright law does not apply extraterritorially.26 Numerous

18. See id.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 501.
20. See id.
21. 208 U.S. 260 (1908).
22. See id. at 264 (holding that copyright does not extend “beyond the jurisdiction
where that law was in force”).
23. See id. at 263–64. Prior to 1976, published copyrighted works required notice to
perfect the copyright.
24. Id. at 264 (quoting Act of March 3, 1905, c. 1432, 33 Stat. 1000 (1905)).
25. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (holding that, unless
specifically outlined in statute or included in congressional intent, laws made by Congress are
presumed to apply only territorially). In response to the Supreme Court’s holding, Congress
amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to extend to U.S. citizens working overseas for U.S.
companies. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C § 2000e(f) (1994)).
26. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 1994);
FilmVideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981); Ahbez v. Edwin H. Mor-
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commentators have also agreed that copyright law does not apply extraterritorially because the statute does not explicitly provide for extraterritorial application, congressional intent does not specify broad
application to extraterritorial infringements, courts have traditionally
limited copyright to territorial application, and international comity
concerns require abstaining from treading upon other nations’ reserved rights to govern within their own boundaries.27 This Comment proposes that the territorial restriction on recognizing copyright infringements should not hinder the courts from exercising
subject matter jurisdiction over contributory infringements based on
wholly extraterritorial infringements where the contributorily infringing party benefiting from the infringement is a U.S. entity over
which a U.S. court may validly exercise personal jurisdiction.

B. Extraterritoriality and its Effect on Reverse Engineering Software
A fundamental difference exists between copyright and patent
protections with respect to reverse engineering. Reverse engineering
has been a traditional method for finding out how a particular patented invention works; a party does not infringe by purchasing a patented product and then subsequently reverse-engineering the product to discover how it functions or what composes the product.
Once the functionality has been discovered, the party doing the reverse engineering can create a compatible or similar product without
infringing on the patented work.
Reverse-engineering a piece of software, as opposed to reverseengineering a patent, creates problems when a “copy” of the copyrighted software is made for the reverse engineering process and subsequent analysis. The actual reverse engineering itself does not create
liability. Rather, making a copy of the software or source code leads
to liability for copyright infringement.28 The creation of this “copy”
ris & Co., 548 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
27. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.02 (2000). Unlike patent law, copyright law
does not contain explicit statutory limitations restricting liability to infringing acts occurring
within territories of the United Stated. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, 501, 602 (1994).
28. Software, including user interfaces and source code, like other protectable works
involving copyright law, is only protected to the extent of its original expression. See 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1994). The user interface is the part of the software program and associated
devices that allows the person using the software to interact with the software program. The
interface is composed of a number of devices, including output devices, such as a monitor or
speakers, and input devices, such as the keyboard, mouse, joystick, microphone, and any other
device used to provide information from the user to the computer program. Source code is the
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directly infringes the copyright owner’s exclusive right to “copy”
under section 106 of the Copyright Act.29
The Ninth Circuit held in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Alcolade,
Inc.,30 that “copying necessary for reverse engineering can be a fair
use when the reverse engineering party has a legitimate reason for
doing so and when no other means of access to the unprotected
elements exists.”31 According to the court, if another method exists
form of the computer program written by the computer programmer in a language that the
programmer understands. The source code is then “compiled” into a machine-readable form,
which the computer interprets in the computing process. The source code is necessarily comprised of “expression” due to the way the particular programmer writes the source code and
functional elements, which cause the computer/computer program to behave in a particular
way due to the algorithm created by the programmer. The algorithm and the mathematical
function it emulates is likely not protectable because the mathematical function is an idea, not
the protectable expression of an idea. The expression must be in a “tangible medium.” Id.
Underlying ideas and functional aspects of software code are not protectable, see id.; however,
attempting to reach and understand the underlying ideas and functional aspects necessarily implicates copying the associated protectable expression, which may likely result in copyright infringement. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). The
Ninth Circuit recognized that copying software code in whole is de facto copyright infringement; however, the Court held as fair use the copying of software source code to identify and
understand the “unprotected functional elements of the program.” Id. at 1514.
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
30. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
31. Id. at 1514. After the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sega, Congress, in 1998, passed
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998), which also provides for restrictions on the extent of copying that a party may undertake for reverse engineering purposes where copyright protection systems restrict access to the
underlying work—the source code in the case of software. The DMCA’s focus on reverse engineering allows a party to circumvent a copyright protection system in only limited circumstances. The House Report on the DMCA indicates that the reverse engineering fair-use provision explicitly provided by the DMCA is “intended to promote reverse engineering by
permitting the circumvention of access control technologies for the sole purpose of achieving
software interoperability.” H.R REP. NO. 105-551 pt. 2, at 42 (1998). The relevant portion of
the House Report reads:
Section 102(f) is intended to promote reverse engineering by permitting the circumvention of access control technologies for the sole purpose of achieving software
interoperability. Section 102(f)(1) permits the act of circumvention in only certain
instances. To begin with, the copy of the computer program which is the subject of
the analysis must be lawfully acquired (i.e., the computer program must be acquired
from a legitimate source, along with any necessary serial codes, passwords, or other
such means as may be necessary to be able to use the program as it was designed to
be used by a consumer of the product). In addition, the acts must be limited to
those elements of the program which must be analyzed to achieve interoperability of
an independently created program with other programs. The resulting product must
also be a new and original work, in that it may not infringe the original computer
program. Moreover, the objective of the analysis must be to identify and extract
such elements as are necessary to achieve interoperability which are not otherwise
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for understanding the unprotected elements of a computer program,
those methods seemingly must be exhausted before a party may seek
to lawfully reverse-engineer the software under a fair use defense.32
The problem of “copying” with respect to reverse-engineering software would rarely arise in a “machine” situation where the reverseengineering party purchases a patented machine and subsequently
reverse-engineers the patented article. Copyright law places a restriction on allowing the copying necessary to access and analyze the unprotectable “ideas” incorporated in the source code of a copyrighted
software product. Copying, not reverse-engineering, gives rise to
copyright infringement.33
available to the person. Finally, the goal of this section is to ensure that current law
is not changed, and not to encourage or permit infringement. Thus, each of the acts
undertaken must avoid infringing the copyright of the author of the underlying
computer program.

Id.
The DMCA permits reverse engineering only to “a person who has lawfully obtained the
right to use a copy of a computer program,” but only for overcoming compatibility concerns.
112 Stat. at 2866. The corollary is that a party engaging in reverse engineering that does not
obtain the lawful right to use the program or reverse engineers for reasons other than establishing compatibility between computer programs is per se liable for copyright infringement if the
situation necessitates circumventing the access control technology. The DMCA further restricts
the scope of reverse engineering to the “sole purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other programs.” Id. The DMCA does not restrict the reverse engineering of the target software directly. Instead, the Act restricts reverse engineering indirectly
by only allowing circumvention of the “copyright protection system” for the sole purpose of
reverse engineering to achieve “interoperability of an independently created computer program.” Id. The DMCA, on its face, appears not to restrict reverse engineering when no “copyright protection system” is involved. See id. Thus, the DMCA appears to prohibit the “circumvention of copyright protection systems” for any purpose other than reverse engineering for
purposes of establishing interoperability between programs. Reverse engineering to look at the
functional aspects of the program for the purpose of creating a competing program would exceed the permissions granted by the DMCA and would likely constitute a copyright violation.
See id.
The provision provided by the DMCA for circumventing “copyright protections systems” for reverse engineering purposes seems to be particularly narrow in scope. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Sega does not necessarily condone reverse engineering for the commercial
purpose of creating a new program that contains competing functionality. See Sega Enters.
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520–29 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Sony Computer
Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (elaborating on the rule in
Sega). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (outlining the “fair use” defense in copyright
law).
32. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520–29 (discussing the validity of a “fair use” claim as applied to reverse engineering where no other means exists for discovering the functional aspects
of the software in question).
33. A problem with these restrictions on reverse engineering based in copyright is that
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The territorial limitations on patent and copyright provide no
protection for an infringing act that occurs entirely extraterritorially.34 Patent law’s application to extraterritorial acts may be an example for copyright to follow, but, as with copyright, U.S. patent
laws do not apply abroad. Copying necessary for reverse engineering
that takes place abroad in violation of U.S. copyright law is not currently actionable according to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
copyright law is territorial in nature, so liability naturally only extends to domestic infringing
acts. Currently, a U.S.-based software company (“Company One”) can contract with a foreign
software development firm to reverse engineer a software product created by another U.S.
competitor. Company One can now take the functional aspects of the competitor’s software
product and incorporate those functional elements into its own product in direct competition
with the competitor, all without a single violation of U.S. copyright law. Due to the territorial
limitations of copyright, Company One can thus essentially sidestep the law by “outsourcing”
reverse engineering to a software company situated abroad and can then subsequently incorporate the ideas from the reverse-engineered software directly into a new product for distribution
in the United States, clearly a hypertechnical, but effective, method of circumventing U.S.
copyright law.
34. See supra Part II.A. Patent law, differing from copyright law, explicitly references
U.S. territorial limitations in the patent statutes when determining patent infringement. See 35
U.S.C. § 271 (1994). The statute makes reference to the assertion that parties will generally
only be liable for patent infringement if at least part of the infringing activity takes place within
United States territorial limits. “[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.” Id. The patent statute also provides for the “right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 154. Courts
have strictly applied the statute and have consistently limited the scope of patent protection to
the territorial limits of the United States. See generally Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S.
641 (1915); Brown v. Duchesne, 42 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1857). For example, in Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Co., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), Deepsouth manufactured the composite
parts for a shrimp deveining machine that would infringe Laitram’s shrimp deveining machine
if Deepsouth’s machine were sold or assembled in the United States. Deepsouth shipped the
parts outside of the United States for assembly and use, essentially slipping though the cracks
in the then-current patent act. Laitram brought an action against Deepsouth for contributory
infringement for Deepsouth’s manufacture and exportation of the unassembled deveining machine. Laitram relied on § 271(b)’s language, which states that “[w]hoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” Id. at 522 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271
(1964)). The Supreme Court held that the patent act did not extend extraterritorially to cover
the acts of direct infringement that occurred abroad by the extraterritorial sale and assembly of
the Deepsouth deveining machine. The Supreme Court further clarified the territorial limitations of patent law by stating, “The statute makes it clear that it is not an infringement to make
or use a patented product outside of the United States.” Id. at 527. A showing of direct infringement necessarily requires a showing that the infringing party “‘makes,’ ‘uses,’ or ‘sells’
the patented product within the bounds of this country.” Id. Following the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Deepsouth, as long as the allegedly infringing conduct occurs wholly extraterritorially, a possible infringer will not be liable under U.S. patent law.
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exterritoriality.35 Companies doing business in the United States
have an easy method of circumventing the copyright laws to their
personal gain by doing their copying abroad; however, those persons
or entities wanting to enforce their intellectual property rights still
have other limited possibilities, such as third-party liability, for finding retribution.36

C. Contributory Infringement
Through the application of third-party liability, the courts can
hold third-party entities partially liable for extraterritorial infringing
conduct. Contributory infringement is the basic concept of holding a
third party liable for the acts of another due to a special relationship
between the third party and the infringing party.37 Thus, the
possibility exists that a third party residing within the territorial limits
of the United States can be sued for copyright infringement
perpetrated by a related party, even though the alleged infringement
occurs entirely extraterritorially. But the law is unclear on whether a
company residing in the United States would be liable in the
situation where infringing copying occurs for the reverse engineering
of software that an extraterritorial subsidiary or similarly associated
(contracted) party perpetrates entirely abroad.

1. Copyright and contributory infringement
Copyright law provides for two types of third-party liability: contributory infringement and vicarious liability. The principles are similar; contributory infringement is merely the broader application of
traditional vicarious liability.38
Contributory infringement extends liability for a direct infringing
act to third parties based on (1) an association between the directly
infringing party and the third party, and (2) a finding of underlying
direct infringement.39 The copyright statute provides no explicit authority for finding contributory infringement. In the reverse, however, the statute does not prohibit a court from finding contributory

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
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infringement.40 The Supreme Court in Sony explained that “the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader
problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold
one individual accountable for the actions of another.”41 To find
contributory infringement, the Sony court relied on patent law constructs and the history of contributory infringement as applied in
patent infringement cases.42 Following the patent law lead, the Court
acknowledged the necessity of a “relationship between the direct infringer and the contributory infringer at the time the infringing conduct occurred.”43 The Court further observed that in cases involving
contributory infringement, liability would be justly found if “the
‘contributory’ infringer was in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by others.”44 Thus, as stated by the Second Circuit in

40. See Sony Corp. at 434 (noting that “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render
anyone liable for infringement committed by another”).
41. Id. at 435.
42. See id. at 439. Patent law expressly provides a cause of action for contributory infringement as outlined in § 271, providing that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a
patent shall be liable as an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. 271 (1994). Similar to copyright law, contributory infringement in patent law also requires an underlying direct infringement; if no direct infringement occurs, then contributory infringement cannot follow. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972); supra Part II.B. Contributory
infringement has the possibility of extending to actions that take place overseas; however, as
indicated in Deepsouth, an underlying direct infringement must occur in the United States
before a potential contributory infringer can be found liable for contributory infringement. See
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 518. Contributory infringement in patent law will extend to any foreign entity that
offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a
component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition . . .
knowing the same to be . . . adapted for use in an infringement of such patent . . .
shall be liable as a contributory infringer
as long as some discernable act takes place in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (Supp.
2001). See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 518. If an infringing act occurs in the United States, an
extraterritorial entity may thus be liable under U.S. patent law for patent infringement if the
entity meets the other requirements of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Both patent
and copyright law are bounded by the territorial limits of the United States. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (holding that “[i]t is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). The Subafilms court determined that Congress intended
copyright law to extend extraterritorially because absent language or congressional intent to
the contrary, laws are to apply only domestically. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
43. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 437.
44. Id.
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Gershwin Publishing,45 a party “who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”46 In essence, contributory infringement is operative if the
third party (1) knowingly (2) causes or contributes (sometimes requiring control by the third party) (3) the primary infringer to directly infringe the copyright in question.
2. Copyright and vicarious liability
In addition to contributory infringement, a third party may also
be liable under the traditional form of third-party liability—vicarious
liability. Again, the Second Circuit has enunciated a clear standard by
imposing liability where the vicariously liable party has “the right and
ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.”47 Generally, vicarious liability has been
based on the principle of respondeat superior, but, as indicated by
the Second Circuit’s holding in Gershwin Publishing, vicarious liability in the context of copyright infringement now extends beyond the
employer-employee relationship.48 The House Report of the Copyright Act indicates that “profit” and the “right to control” are the
dispositive factors; actual knowledge is not a prerequisite.49 Third
parties must beware lest they be found liable under a theory of either
contributory infringement or vicarious liability for a direct infringer’s
conduct.
Third-party liability in the form of contributory infringement and
vicarious liability is merely a tool that may be used to partially dissuade foreign copyright infringements through the use of domestic

45. Gershwin Publ’g Co. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
46. Id. at 1162.
47. Id.
48. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04 (2000).
49. See id. In reference to the liability of owners of ballrooms or night clubs for contributory infringement, the House Report states:
To be held a related or vicarious infringer in the case of performing rights, a defendant must either actively operate or supervise the operation of the place wherein the
performances occur, or control the content of the infringing program, and expect
commercial gain from the operation and either direct or indirect benefit from the infringing performance. The committee has decided that no justification exists for
changing the current law . . . .
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), at 159–60.). The statute essentially codified the
then-current common law.
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law. Both doctrines have necessarily and traditionally required finding at least one act of domestic infringement on which to base thirdparty liability. These two third-party liability doctrines may be beneficial; however, the doctrines circumvent the real problem of
preventing extraterritorial copyright infringement by either the
perpetrating party or, more importantly, the domestic party in
position to reap the financial benefit of the foreign unlawful act.

D. Importation of Infringing Goods
Both patent and copyright law contain prohibitions on the importation of items that infringe a copyright or patent granted in the
United States;50 however, significant differences in protections
granted by statute also exist.
Compared to patent protection, copyright protection is more
limited in scope by section 102’s language requiring that copyrighted works be “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.”51 The statutory requirement of “originality”
dictates that the work must be an independent creation featuring a
“modicum of creativity.”52 Similarly, copyright protection does not
extend to ideas, “regardless of the form in which [the idea] is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”53 As described by statute, section 602 will only grant the copyright owner
the same protections against an imported infringing copy as the protections copyright law provides to the copyright owner against an infringing copy created within the territorial limitation of the United
States. Thus, the law treats liability for infringing imports the same as
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1994). Patent protection applies to
the discovery or invention of “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, to be
patentable, an invention must meet other requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and utility.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. Even if another inventor independently creates or invents from
scratch a similar or identical invention, the second inventor foregoes the right to make, use,
sell, or offer to sell the patented work. See 35 U.S.C. § 271. Any person who imports an article, even though independently created and patented extraterritorially, that violates (as determined by the patent statute) the patented invention is liable for patent infringement. See id.
Patent law grants a full monopoly to the U.S. patent holder regardless of whether a foreign
patent currently exists. Additionally, U.S. patent law keeps similar foreign or subsequent independently created patents out of the U.S. market for the duration of the original patent covering the invention.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
52. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 102.

1291

15DALL.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/5/01 3:20 AM

[2001

infringing copies created within U.S. territorial limits.
Copyright, through section 602, also acts to prevent a party from
importing an infringing derivative work.54 However, in the case of
software, a party can circumvent U.S. law and reverse-engineer a
product abroad without incorporating any element of expression
from the original work, rendering the protection against importing
derivative works worthless as a tool for preventing extraterritorial infringement involving the copying necessary to reverse-engineer protected or copyrighted software.
Preventing the importation of infringing items preserves the
copyright monopoly in the United States, but a U.S. entity can still
reap the profits of works infringed and distributed abroad with the
subsequent profits returning and pooling in a U.S. entity. The current copyright law will not deter U.S. entities from making profits
abroad by infringing U.S. copyrights in foreign jurisdictions because
of lack of subject matter jurisdiction where the U.S. courts clearly
may exercise personal jurisdiction.

E. Liability for Extraterritorial Conduct When at Least One
Infringing Act Occurs in the United States
Liability for extraterritorial conduct can take the form of contributory infringement, as long as at least one direct act of infringement occurs within the territorial limits of the United States.55 Traditionally, courts have held that liability for extraterritorial direct
infringements can also be remedied under the ability of the courts to
extend remedies for copyright infringement to infringing acts
abroad, as long as at least one infringing act occurs within the territorial limits of the United States.56 Beginning with Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,57 courts have recognized that if an
associated act of territorial copyright infringement occurs, a copyright owner can successfully sue for the extraterritorial profits based
on the extraterritorial infringement, even though the profits resulted
from infringing activity abroad.58 In Sheldon, the infringer appropri54. See 17 U.S.C. § 602; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (recognizing the exclusive right in
the copyright holder to create derivative works based on the copyrighted work).
55. See supra Part II.C.
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 504; Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390
(1940); Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
57. 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
58. Cf. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) (stating in dicta
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ated part of a play into a motion picture that was shown domestically, as well as abroad.59 The issue before the court was whether, in
granting a remedy of profits, all of the profits from the film, both
domestic and foreign, or only the profits directly derived from the
infringement, should be granted to the copyright owner.60
The infringing party argued that copyright law does not apply
extraterritorially, so profits from extraterritorial infringement should
be exempt from any accounting.61 The Second Circuit found that the
extraterritorial infringement was based, in large part, on direct infringement that originally occurred within the United States.62 “The
[defendant] made the negatives in this country, or had them made
here, and shipped them abroad, where the positives were produced
and exhibited. The negatives were ‘records’ from which the work
could be ‘reproduced’, and it was a tort to make them in this country.”63 The court held that upon creation of the infringing “records”
in the United States, “[t]he plaintiffs acquired an equitable interest
in them . . . which attached to any profits from their exploitation.”64
The court further assumed that any profits “took the form of property whose situs was in the United States.”65 The court, in essence,
allowed the plaintiff to recover for profits directly attributable to territorial and extraterritorial infringement, as long as a directly related
prerequisite infringing act, which enabled the foreign infringement,
took place in the United States.
Copyright holders can utilize a strong tool in preventing foreign
infringements where at least one infringing act occurs in the United
States, but the same copyright holder seems to be at an extreme loss
that if Deepsouth infringed the patent in the United States, liability may be incurred for related
extraterritorial conduct). See generally Sheldon, 106 F.2d. 45; Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin
Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that copyright law, even though territorial in nature, can apply abroad when infringement in the United States “permits further reproduction abroad”); Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 560
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (holding that as long as a prerequisite act of direct infringement enabling extraterritorial infringement occurred in the United States, the copyright owner could recover
profits from the foreign infringement in proportion to the extent the infringement contributed
to profits).
59. See Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 48, 52.
60. See id. at 48–49.
61. See id. at 51–52.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 52.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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under current law if no direct infringement occurs domestically. The
absence of congressional intent with respect to contributory infringement and vicarious liability has created two opposing views
with respect to the necessity of requiring an underlying direct infringement before finding third-party liability. Some courts have
found the underlying domestic infringement requirements in the “to
authorize” language of section 106, finding that to hold otherwise
would recognize a seemingly outdated, outmoded hypertechnicality
in the law that fails to recognize the current breadth of the digital
age.66 The fear is that requiring an underlying infringing act other
than “authorization” to occur domestically before finding third-party
liability will prevent an infringer from paying what is owed the copyright holder for an unlawful infringing act. In response to the traditional view of copyright and in relation to territoriality, some courts
have found third- party liability based on an “authorization right,”
even though infringement does not otherwise occur domestically.67
The controversy arises when determining whether third-party liability actually requires underlying domestic infringement other than authorization, or merely some recognized violation of section 106,
domestic or abroad.68 The results are unclear.
III. APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES LAW TO CERTAIN FOREIGN
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENTS
Copyright law should be interpreted more expansively to include
extraterritorial infringements occurring abroad that benefit U.S. entities, especially where the U.S. entity is a contributory infringer. Even
though copyright law does not extend to infringements abroad, certain provisions or “exceptions and extensions” in current practice allow U.S. courts to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a limited
number of foreign actions. Contributory infringement and vicarious
liability69 allow the courts to exercise jurisdiction over a party and the
ensuing infringement where the party, “with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”70 Such a party “may be held liable as a

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
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‘contributory’ infringer.”71 Protecting against importation of infringing goods also prevents infringing goods from entering and affecting
the U.S. market. This protection, however, does not preclude infringements from occurring abroad, nor do the protections keep
domestic entities from benefiting by circumventing the law.72 Another more controversial and expansive method of exercising subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign infringement is to recognize an independent cause of action in the “to authorize” language of section
106.73 The law remains unclear whether a cause of action based
solely on the authorization language is valid where no underlying
domestic infringement occurs.74 Recognizing a cause of action based
on the “to authorize” language of section 106 or expansively treating the currently recognized “to authorize”-based contributory infringement would prevent circumvention of copyright law and prohibit U.S. entities from making unlawful profits from infringements
perpetrated abroad.

A. The “To Authorize” Language of Section 106
1. The Subafilms decision: No new right based on the “to
authorize” language
In Subafilms,75 the Ninth Circuit limited liability under the “to
authorize” language of section 106 to contributory infringement requiring domestic direct infringement.76 At least two other courts and
numerous commentators have criticized the Subafilms court’s decision that mere authorization in the United States of an infringing act
that occurs outside of the United States does not constitute liability
for the authorizing party under direct or contributory infringe-

1971).
71. Id.
72. See supra Part II.A.
73. See infra Part III.A.1–2.
74. See infra Part III.A.1–2.
75. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc). The original three-judge panel in Subafilms affirmed the lower court’s finding of infringement, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s prior holding in Peter Starr Prod. Co. v.
Twin Continental Films, Inc., 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986). See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGMPathe Communications Co., No. 91-56248, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 4068 (9th Cir. 1993).
76. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1088.
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ment.77 In Subafilms, the issue was whether a company was liable for
contributory infringement where that company, through its subsidiary, authorized the wholly extraterritorial sale and distribution of a
film in which the company had no intellectual property right.78 To
confront the problem, the Subafilms court drew an analogy from
patent law analysis found in previous Supreme Court cases that disallowed a cause of action for contributory patent infringement where
no underlying direct infringement occurred due to the wholly extraterritorial nature of the direct infringement.79
The key points of the Subafilms court’s analysis turned on an examination of the language in section 106 where “the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following,”80 and the allegation that the directly infringing
action occurred wholly extraterritorially.81 The court held that violation of the “to authorize” phrase does not constitute a violation under section 50182 of the act unless the underlying “authorized” action actually violates one of the six exclusive rights in section 106,
which would result in an infringement under section 501.83 The
court held that “to authorize” is not cognizable as a separate right
under section 106; the court further held that the addition of the
words “to authorize” to section 106 did not add a new cause of ac-

77. See, e.g., Expediters Int’l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,
995 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1998); Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586 (M.D. Tenn.
1995); Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritioriality in Copyright Infringement,
37 VA. J. INT’L L. 600 (1997).
78. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1088.
79. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972). (“It is
plain that . . . the Patent Code enacted in 1952 [] made no change in the fundamental precept
that there can be no contributory infringement in the absence of a direct infringement.”)
(quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961)); see
also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting on other grounds).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
81. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1089–90, 1093. The court also relied in part upon the
Supreme Court’s “analogized” use of patent law to help determine copyright cases “because of
the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). Other courts have found liability to exist where
at least one act of infringement occurred in the United States. See, e.g., Ahbez v. Edwin H.
Morris & Co., 548 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records,
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 501.
83. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1090–94.
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tion based on mere authorization of an infringing act.84 The court
stated that the addition of the language “to authorize” was “intended to invoke the preexisting doctrine of contributory infringement.”85
In overruling the Ninth Circuit’s own previous decision in Peter
Starr Products Co. v. Twin Continental Films, Inc.,86 where the
court held that “authorization, . . . standing alone, is sufficient to
confer subject matter jurisdiction,”87 the Subafilms court, sitting en
banc, held that mere authorization of an infringing act occurring extraterritorially cannot constitute copyright infringement.88 First, con-

84. See id. at 1092. The court acknowledged that under the “to authorize” language, a
party can still be directly liable for authorizing an underlying infringement cognizable under
the copyright act. Essentially, the court recognized that the addition of the “to infringe” language in section 106 requires or allows contributory infringers who authorize infringing acts to
be held directly liable for copyright infringement, but a prerequisite is that the authorizing
party must first be liable for contributory infringement; contributory infringement requires that
direct infringement occur. If no underlying direct infringement occurs, then contributory infringement does not exist. In making this assertion, the Subafilms court relied on a patent infringement case, Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), where the
Supreme Court held that a party could not be held liable for contributory infringement under
patent law unless an underlying act of direct infringement occurred, and that the “authorizing”
party obviously could not be directly liable under the “to authorize” language of § 106.
Allowing parties to be held liable for authorizing infringing conduct would open up the
possibility for large amounts of litigation based on the “to infringe” language. Liability for authorizing infringement would be particularly unfair in cases where no underlying territorial or
extraterritorial direct infringement occurs. The Subafilms court took great pains to explain
these prerequisites and differences in its opinion. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d.at 1092–94.
85. Id. at 1092. The court further stated:
The exclusive rights accorded to a copyright owner under section 106 are “to do
and to authorize” any of the activities specified in the five numbered clauses. Use of
the phrase “to authorize” is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of
contributory infringers. For example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized
copy of a motion picture would be an infringer if he or she engages in the business
of renting it to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance.
Id. at 1093 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 61 (1976)).
86. 783 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986). In Peter Starr, the Ninth Circuit held that liability
extends to the authorizing party by the mere authorization in the United States of an infringing act that occurs extraterritorially even though no direct violation occurs in the United
States. See id.
87. Id. at 1443. In coming to a conclusion, the Peter Starr court relied on language in a
footnote in Sony stating that “an infringer is not merely one who uses a work without
authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who authorizes the use of a copyrighted
work without actual authority from the copyright owner.” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984). The Peter Starr court essentially relied on the
dicta of a footnote for its main holding in the case.
88. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1090–92.
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tributory infringement generally requires an act of direct infringement and, second, copyright law does not extend to direct acts of infringement occurring extraterritorially. Thus, according to the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning, a foreign violation of one of the six exclusive
rights under section 106 is not an infringement recognized or actionable due to the territorial limitations of U.S. law.89

2. Curb and Expediters International: Recognizing a new cause of
action by the addition of the “to authorize” language to section 106
a. Curb. In Curb v. MCA Records, Inc.,90 a motion for summary
judgment, one of the questions before the court was whether the “to
infringe” language of section 106 stated a cause of action when the
“authorized” direct infringement occurred wholly extraterritorially.91
The “authorizing” party in Curb argued that it did nothing more
than sign contracts with extraterritorial entities authorizing the distribution abroad of “sound recordings in which Curb had a license
to reproduce [domestically].”92 Finding no precedent in the Sixth
Circuit, the Curb court looked to the Ninth Circuit and Subafilms.93
The Curb court rejected the Subafilms holding that the “to authorize” language was merely an extension of direct liability to contributory infringement by holding that the Subafilms decision was contrary to precedent, current reality, and legislative history.94
89. See id.; see also Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965
(9th Cir. 1992).
90. 898 F. Supp. 586 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
91. See id. at 593.
92. Id.
93. See id. n.3.
94. See id. at 594 (holding that “tying the authorization right solely to a claim of justiciable contributory infringement appears contrary both to well-reasoned precedent, statutory
text, and legislative history”). “Subafilms, thus, reads the authorization right out of the Act in
cases of foreign infringement.” Id. at 595. Interestingly enough, however, the court provides
no authority for its assertion other than policy arguments recited by the court and California
district court cases subsequently overruled by the Ninth Circuit in Subafilms. The Curb court
outlined policy arguments similar to the following excerpt:
But piracy has changed since the Barbary days. Today, the raider need not grab the
bounty with his own hands; he need only transmit his go-ahead by wire or telefax to
start the presses in a distant land. Subafilms ignores this economic reality, and the
economic incentives underpinning the Copyright Clause designed to encourage the
creation of new works, and transforms infringement of the authorization right into a
requirement of domestic presence by a primary infringer. Under this view, a phone
call to Nebraska results in liability; the same phone call to France results in riches. In
a global marketplace, it is literally a distinction without a difference.
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Even though the Curb court tentatively rejected the Subafilms
holding, the Curb court further found that Curb, the defendant infringer, must likely have infringed the sound recording domestically
by creating a master copy of the recording in the United States to
send to its distributors overseas—a direct act of domestic infringement unless Curb sent its originals, which was highly unlikely.95 The
Curb decision almost supports Subafilms by suggesting that even if
the Curb court is wrong in rejecting Subafilms, Curb likely committed an underlying domestic act of direct infringement on which to
predicate a finding of contributory infringement, still making Curb
liable under the Subafilms court’s interpretation of the “to authorize” language.96 Nevertheless, the Curb court later tried to distinguish its reasoning by relying on policy arguments and legislative history to find that an underlying domestic direct infringement is not
required. The Curb court tried laboriously to convince itself that the
“to authorize” language constituted a separate right.97
The Curb court finally concluded that domestic direct infringement, other than a violation of the “to authorize” language, of a section 106 exclusive right is not required to find an “authorizing”
party directly liable for infringement based on the “to authorize”
language of section 106. The court held that liability extends to the
“authorizer” regardless of the location of the direct infringement,
despite of the restrictions on extraterritorial application of copyright
law cited in its own opinion and by the Ninth Circuit in Subafilms.98
The only requirement for infringement set forth by the Curb court is
that the “authorized” activity be “the sort of activity that infringes
upon a copyright owner’s exclusive 106 rights”;99 however, according to the Curb court, that infringing activity need not take place
domestically because of Curb’s recognition of a separate right “to
authorize.”
Id. at 595.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. “A better view, one supported by the text, the precedents, and, ironically
enough, the legislative history . . . , would be to hold that domestic violation of the authorization right is an infringement . . . whenever the authorizee has committed an act that would
violate the copyright owner’s § 106 rights.” Id. (emphasis added).
98. See generally id. at 593; Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24
F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
99. Curb, 898 F. Supp. at 595–96. The Curb court relied on California district court
precedent that was subsequently overruled in the Ninth Circuit’s Subafilms decision.
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b. Expediters International. In Expediters International of Washington, Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Management Systems, Inc.,100 the
court followed the reasoning of the Curb court and determined that
a separate right “to authorize” exists under section 106. Expediters
International (“EI”) sued Direct Line (“DLCMS”) for copyright infringement that occurred entirely overseas beyond the scope of U.S.
copyright law.101 DLCMS mailed a lawfully licensed copy of EI’s
software overseas to its subsidiaries. After the license expired, the
subsidiaries continued to use the software, in violation of the software license agreement.102
Similar to Subafilms, the copyright infringement issue before the
court was whether DLCMS could be liable under the “to authorize”
language of section 106 for its actions in continuing to allow the
subsidiaries to use the software in violation of the software license
agreement.103 The Expediters court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Subafilms, where the court held that the “authorized” direct infringement must actually occur domestically before an
authorizing party will be held liable as a contributory infringer.104
The Expediters court repeated the Subafilms rule that if the direct
infringement occurred extraterritorially, the “authorizing” party
would not be liable because copyright law does not apply extraterritorially and no actionable direct infringement exists on which to base
contributory infringement.105 However, the Expediters court rejected
the Ninth Circuit’s rule and chose to follow Curb.106 The Curb court
held that the “to authorize” language of section 106 created an independent action for direct liability (infringement), not an action for
contributory infringement that relies on an act of direct infringement
occurring domestically.”107 In holding that liability exists under the
“to authorize” language, the Expediters court relied on policy arguments set forth in Curb, “which appear more closely adapted to our

100. 995 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1998).
101. See id. at 468, 475.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 475–77.
104. See id. at 476. See generally Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co.
24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
105. See Expediters, 995 F. Supp. at 476; supra Part III.A.2.a.
106. See Expediters, 995 F. Supp. at 476.
107. See id. at 476–77; Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595–96 (M.D.
Tenn. 1995).
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modern age of telefaxes, Internet communication, and electronic
mail systems.”108 The court further acknowledged that the “purpose
behind the Copyright Act is to protect a copyright owner’s right to
be free from infringement”109 and that “[t]o allow an entity to curtail
this right by merely directing its foreign agent to do its ‘dirty work’
would . . . hinder the deterrent effect of the statute and thwart its
underlying purpose.”110 The Expediters court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis by looking past the letter of the law, and relied on
copyright protection policies to find liability where no direct territorial infringement occurred.

3. Subafilms Versus Curb and Expediters: Which analysis better
serves to promote the policies of the Copyright Act?
The Curb and Expediters courts’ recognition of liability, based
on the “to authorize” language of section 106 where an underlying
foreign or domestic direct infringement occurs, serves to promote
the underlying policies of the Copyright Act. Curb and Expediters
both adhere to international comity concerns by finding third-party
copyright liability where a domestic authorization (a domestic infringing action) leads to direct infringement. Neither court would
find liability for the directly infringing foreign party because finding
such liability would extend the bounds of copyright law beyond its
territorial limits. Also, neither court would find liability for mere authorization where no underlying direct infringement occurs.
The position advocated by the Curb and Expediters courts with
respect to the “to authorize” language of the Copyright Act better
serves the policies and protections of the act than the Ninth Circuit’s
position requiring domestic direct infringement. Literally, the difference between the two positions is not whether direct infringement
occurs, but whether the direct infringement is domestic or foreign.
Recognizing liability under the “to authorize” language, as outlined
by Curb and Expediters, follows legal precedent and legislative history by finding third-party liability in the form of contributory infringement. The only difference is in the Subafilms requirement that
the direct infringement occur domestically. In either the domestic or
foreign direct infringement case, the underlying direct infringement
108. Expediters, 995 F. Supp. at 476–77.
109. Id. at 477.
110. Id.
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still occurs and the entity or entities infringing or endorsing the infringement still benefit financially from the infringement regardless
of whether the law recognizes the unlawful act.
The Subafilms court, in its reluctance to find copyright infringement, focused on the wrong question: whether direct extraterritorial
infringement is cognizable direct infringement under U.S. copyright
law. The Subafilms court should have focused on whether some type
of direct infringement actually occurred. The Ninth Circuit was perplexed by the question of whether recognizing a separate cause of action based on the “to authorize” language would open up a plethora
of cases focusing on authorization instead of infringement. The
Ninth Circuit clearly erred in its assumption that an action based on
the “to authorize” language would open the courts to new litigation
because the court failed to recognize the real issue. The Subafilms
court failed to recognize that the perfectly logical path to follow was
to allow a cause of action based on the “to authorize” language regardless of where the direct infringement occurred, instead of limiting the underlying direct infringement to the territorial limits of U.S.
law. The Ninth Circuit assumed that by allowing a cause of action
based on the “to authorize” language, the law would have to recognize a cause of action based on mere authorization without the necessity of an underlying direct infringement.
The Curb court, on the other hand, clearly explained that authorization itself should only give rise to infringement where some
form of direct infringement occurs—wherever the direct infringement occurs. The Curb court further explained that the direct infringement should not be restricted to direct infringement occurring
domestically. The inquiry is not where the direct infringement occurs, but where the “authorization” of the direct infringement occurs. When the “authorization” occurs domestically, the authorizing
party should be liable domestically, even though the direct infringement occurs abroad. Focusing on the wrong question—whether
domestic direct infringement occurs, instead of simply requiring
some form of direct infringement, domestic or abroad—detracted
from the soundness of the Subafilms decision. Curb is not advocating finding liability based solely on the “to authorize” language.
Rather, Curb still requires an act of direct infringement, domestic or
foreign.111
111. There is a problem with respect to determining whether direct infringement exists.
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As indicated by the Curb court, the Subafilms decision failed to
recognize the current state of the Internet, international companies,
and international business agreements. The Curb court clearly
pointed out this issue, noting that a “phone call to Nebraska results
in liability; the same phone call to France results in riches.”112
The position advocated by Curb and Expediters surpasses the
Subafilms decision with respect to the current global economy and
the proliferation of the Internet. With the use of the Internet, a party
may transmit electronic information nearly anywhere in the world.
Following the Curb holding that the “to authorize” right is violated
anytime a party authorizes an infringement that violates a section
106 exclusive right, promoting copyright protection in the Internet
age will allow entities to better enforce their intellectual property
rights by allowing the courts to exercise jurisdiction over companies
authorizing extraterritorial infringing actions. Subafilms undermines
a copyright holder’s ability to enforce its rights against another U.S.
entity perpetrating (authorizing and financially backing) infringements outside the territorial bounds of the United States. An entity
should not be able to make large profits from another’s intellectual
property by simply evading the law by locating infringing activities
outside the territorial limits of the United States, especially when the
entities profiting from the infringements are U.S. entities promoting
and financing the operations.113 Expediters and Curb “curb” these
types of extraterritorial infringements allowed by Subafilms.

B. Preventing Copyright Violations Through the Application of
United States Law to Certain Foreign Infringements
Copyright law provides a limited number of tools to combat extraterritorial infringement, including finding liability for contributory
infringement and vicarious liability, preventing importation of in-

At least two choices of law exist: U.S. law or the law of the country where the direct infringement occurs. If the law of the country where the direct infringement occurs is applied and that
law is more forgiving than U.S. law with respect to direct infringements, the party suing to
enforce its rights may still be without an adequate legal solution.
112. Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
113. Intentional circumventions of copyright law in the manner expressed above are uncertain. Many countries, especially adherents to the Berne Convention, see infra note 117,
have similar copyright protections. The DMCA uniquely guards certain works protected by
copyright access controls and provides an example where U.S. law may be more restrictive than
another nation’s laws.
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fringing goods, extending third-party liability based on “authorization,” and allowing recovery for foreign infringement where at least
one infringing action occurs territorially. None of these tools is adequate to prevent all foreign infringements, but these tools do provide
a limited range of actions where a copyright holder may seek retribution for infringements occurring abroad. Basing liability on the “authorization” right and not requiring the primary infringement to occur domestically definitely expands copyright protection to
“authorizing” parties who would otherwise be liable had the primary
infringement occurred in the United States. Allowing such a right
would prove to beneficial in promoting intellectual property protections. At the same time, however, concerns of international comity
would seemingly require the law of the territory where the infringement occurred to be applied. A U.S. entity with little or no affiliation
to a foreign entity could escape all liability by merely authorizing a
foreign entity to do the “dirty work” in a jurisdiction abroad—an
unintended result of a small loophole in copyright law protections.
Intellectual property interests and protections call for allowing a
cause of action based on the “authorization” of section 106.
IV. APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW
Courts in the United States have traditionally shied away from
applying foreign intellectual property law to foreign infringements in
U.S. courts.114 International intellectual property treaties creating a
unified standard for certain intellectual property protections have arguably alleviated the need for courts to pass judgment on the foreign
states’ administrative formalities necessary to perfect foreign intellectual property protections.115 U.S. courts may be less likely to dismiss
cases applying foreign law to foreign copyright infringements because of the uniformity in the law after the Berne Convention and
the fact that the particular U.S. court may be the only court with the
power to exercise personal jurisdiction over the infringing party for
numerous infringements occurring in multiple countries.116

114. See infra Part IV.B.
115. See infra Part IV.B; infra Part IV.A.
116. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Berne Convention

Multiple international treaties exist for the protection of intellectual property on an international scale, one of which is the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,117 initially ratified by a small number of countries,118 but subsequently
adopted by a majority of the world’s nations.119 The Berne Convention calls for the protection of expression “fixed in some material
form,”120 whether published or unpublished for a minimum time period of the life of the author plus fifty years.121 The Convention also
calls for a “minimum” baseline protectionist approach, but the individual countries are free to grant protections greater than those required by the treaty.122 Signatories to the Convention must grant at
least the minimum copyright protections outlined in the treaty by
their own domestic laws in their own country to non-nationals. Perhaps the most powerful aspect of the treaty is the Convention’s provision for the protection of the works of non-nationals. The Berne
Convention requires that signatory countries grant non-nationals the
same protection afforded nationals without respect to a need to conform to a given country’s statutory or administrative formalities, such
as a requirement for notice or for registration of the copyrighted
work with a governmental agency.123 Granting the same protections
also includes allowing the non-national to enforce his or her copyright rights under the domestic laws of the country where the infringing activity occurs.124 Thus, the Berne Convention strives to
117. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9,
1986, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
118. Those countries ratifying the treaty within the next year were Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom. See
http://www.wipo.org/treaties/docs/english/e-berne.doc (last visited January 13, 2001).
Subsequently, numerous other countries have become party to the Convention, including the
United States on March 1, 1989. See id. Noticeably absent from the list is Taiwan; however,
political problems between mainland China (a party to the Berne Convention since 1992) and
Taiwan, due to the latter’s partial “independence,” may explain Taiwan’s nonparticipation.
119. See id.
120. Berne Convention, supra note 117, art. 2.
121. See id.
122. See id. art. 19.
123. See id. art. 5. The protection afforded non-nationals must, of course, meet the minimalist protections outlined in the Convention. The signatory countries may still require their
own nationals to register copyrights in order to receive copyright protection. The Convention
only requires protecting non-national’s work without the requirement of registration.
124. Id.
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maintain minimum requirements for copyright protection for nationals and non-nationals alike among the member countries; the
Convention also provides that non-nationals may enforce their copyrights according to the domestic laws in the country where the infringement takes place.

B. Application of Foreign Law in the Courts of the United States to
Extraterritorial Copyright Infringements
1. London Film: The choice to exercise jurisdiction and apply
foreign law
In London Film Productions., Ltd. v. Intercontinental
Communications, Inc.,125 the questions before the court were (1)
whether the court should exercise its jurisdiction to foreign conduct,
and (2) whether the court should apply foreign copyright law to the
alleged foreign infringement.126 London Film, a British corporation,
sued Intercontinental Communications, a New York corporation, for
infringements of London Film’s British copyright in several South
American countries.127 In essence, London Film asked a U.S. court
to enforce London Film’s British copyright in the South American
countries according to the respective countries’ laws in a U.S. court.
London Films argued that the countries in question adhered to the
Berne Convention, which afforded London Film a cause of action
based on its British copyright according to the domestic laws of the
South American countries where the alleged infringing acts took
place.128 The New York forum was likely the only forum where the
allegedly infringing party was subject to personal jurisdiction for all
of the alleged copyright violations.129 At the time, the United States
had not yet ratified the Convention, but the court was asked to apply
the principles of the Convention to the copyright question at hand.
The court recognized that applying foreign law to the action was

125. 580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
126. See id. at 48. At the time of London Film, the United States had not yet become a
party to the Berne Convention. See supra note 118.
127. See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 48. Plaintiff London Film alleged no copyright
infringement in violation of U.S. copyright law.
128. See id. (“[P]laintiff’s claims would have to be determined with reference to each of
the South American states in which the alleged copyright infringements occurred.”).
129. See id. at 48–49.
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not something the court was specialized in doing. Nevertheless, the
court was concerned that the defendant would not be subject to personal jurisdiction for all the infringing acts in any other forum.130
The court recognized that “not every violation of foreign law by a
citizen of this country must be afforded a local tribunal.”131 However, the court recognized the need to adjudicate claims against U.S.
nationals under foreign law if the United States expects reciprocal
treatment from other nations.132 Traditionally, in trademark and patent law, part of determining whether a trademark or a patent is valid
is if the particular administrative formalities of the state has been
met; if such a determination is required, the courts have chosen not
to exercise jurisdiction and the courts refrain from exercising judgment on the validity of the foreign nation’s administrative processes.133 In London Film, the court relied in part on Professor Nimmer’s argument that, under the Berne Convention in signatory
countries, no “act of state” or administrative formality is required to
perfect copyright since the Berne Convention necessarily perfects the
copyright,134 so the copyright “right” is transitory and can be adjudicated in any forum convenient to the litigators.135 Since no “adminis130. See id.
131. Id. at 49.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 49–50. Requiring administrative formalities for trademark and patent registration in a foreign jurisdiction would require the court to pass judgment on the validity of
the foreign process, something no foreign court is really prepared to do. Passing judgment on
the validity of administrative proceedings would necessarily implicate the “act of state” doctrine. In relation to trademark law, which differs in the required amount of administrative action by the domestic government agencies, the Second Circuit in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T.
Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), stated that “we do not think it the province of
United States district courts to determine the validity of trade-marks which officials of foreign
countries have seen fit to grant. To do so would . . . welcome conflicts with the administrative
and judicial officers [of the foreign jurisdiction].” Id. at 647.
134. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.03 (2000). Professor Nimmer notes that if personal jurisdiction can be obtained, a U.S. court could exercise jurisdiction over the copyright
claim “on the theory that copyright infringement constitutes a transitory cause of action . . .
and may be adjudicated in the courts of a sovereign other than the one in which the cause of
action arose.” Id. Further, “under virtually all foreign copyright laws, there are no administrative formalities that must be satisfied . . . [and] there is . . . no need to pass upon the validity of
the acts of foreign government officials.” Id.
135. See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 48–49. In addition to reliance on Professor Nimmer, the court further relied on reciprocity to validate its position:
The Court has an obvious interest in securing compliance with this nation’s laws by
citizens of foreign nations . . . . An unwillingness by this Court to hear a complaint
against its own citizens with regard to a violation of foreign law will engender . . . a
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trative formality” was required to perfect the copyrights in question,
the court did not believe the need for comity necessarily implicated
deferral to the courts of the forum where the infringement occurred.136 The London Films court found jurisdiction in the United
States was proper.137 The court later dismissed the claim on other
grounds, so full adjudication of the issues never took place.138 No
other court has yet chosen to exercise jurisdiction in a similar manner,139 but commentators have supported the court’s analysis as
groundwork for future copyright litigation.140

2. Boosey and Hawkes Music Publishers: The choice not to exercise
jurisdiction or apply foreign law
Contrary to the London Film court, the district court in Boosey
and Hawkes Music Publishers141 declined to apply foreign law and
dismissed foreign copyright actions pertaining to eighteen jurisdictions142 brought against Walt Disney Company by Boosey and

similar unwillingness on the part of a foreign jurisdiction when the question arises
concerning a violation of our laws by one of its citizens . . . .
Id. at 49. But see David R. Toraya, Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Copyright Infringement Actions—An Unsolicited Reply to Professor Nimmer, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1165
(1985). For a general discussion on the holding of the London Films court, see Toraya, supra
(contrasting Professor Nimmer’s approach with an “interests” test where the court should balance four factors: (1) the court’s ability to make an informed disposition of the foreign action,
(2) the nature of the issues presented, (3) the suitability of American enforcement of the
judgment, and (4) the convenience of the litigants and of the forum).
136. See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 49–50.
137. See id. at 50. (“[T]he Court finds it has jurisdiction over the instant case . . . .”).
But see Boosey & Hawkes Music Publ’rs, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing on grounds of forum non conviens). Boosey was later overruled
by the Second Circuit on several issues, including the dismissal on grounds of forum non conviens. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publ’rs, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.
1998).
138. See London Film, 580 F. Supp. at 47.
139. See Boosey, 934 F. Supp. at 119 (dismissing on grounds of forum non conviens);
Boosey, 145 F.3d at 481 (overturning the circuit court’s decision not to exercise jurisdiction
on grounds of forum non conveniens because the district court did not adequately balance the
necessary private and public interest factors).
140. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.03 (2000). See generally Curtis A. Bradley,
Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997).
141. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publ’rs, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp. 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
142. The eighteen jurisdictions were the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Austria, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan. See id. at 122 n.1. The listed countries are all
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Hawkes.143 The district court, declining to exercise jurisdiction,
stated that “the balance of factors strongly favor trial of the copyright issues in each of the nations whose copyright laws are invoked.”144 Subsequently, the court, relying on public policy concerns
noting that foreign jurisdictions are best equipped to apply their own
law, dismissed all copyright actions involving the foreign jurisdictions.145
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision pertaining to the dismissal of the alleged copyright violations on the
grounds of forum non conveniens.146 The Second Circuit held that
the district court did not adequately take into account “[t]he private
interests of the litigants [in] conducting the litigation in New
York.”147 Rather, the district court based its findings almost entirely
on public interest factors centered on the foreign jurisdiction’s interest in applying its own law to the copyright violations.148 Upon balancing private and public factors, the Second Circuit overturned the
district court’s ruling, finding that, overall, the factors weighed in favor of maintaining the suit in New York.149 In comparison to London Film, however, Boosey implicated issues other than merely applying foreign law to extraterritorial copyright infringement.150 The

party to the Berne Convention where the signatories agreed to grant other countries the same
copyright protections as their own nationals. See supra Part IV.A.
143. See Boosey, 934 F. Supp. at 124.
144. Id.
145. See id. (“Those issues are better litigated in the countries where enforcement of the
copyright is sought. The task of discerning the varying policies and laws governing copyright
protection and antitrust issues in each of the eighteen countries is an undue burden on our
judicial system.”).
146. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publ’rs, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 491–
92 (2d Cir. 1998).
147. Id. at 492.
148. See id. “While reluctance to apply foreign law is a valid factor favoring dismissal under [Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947)], standing alone it does not justify dismissal.” Id.
149. See Boosey, 145 F.3d at 491–92. Part of the reasoning for the circuit court’s decision is that the contracts licensing distribution were signed in New York; New York was most
likely the best forum to adjudicate all of the foreign claims at once instead of requiring the
plaintiff to travel to each separate forum; New York favored the convenience of the parties,
counsel, and witnesses; no other alternative, better forum was found by the district court or
suggested by the parties; and adjudicating the action in New York would most likely prove the
least expensive to both parties. See id.
150. See generally id. Other nonexclusive issues discussed in the case included a dispute
over the license agreement, violations of the Lanham Act, and breach of contract. See id.
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Boosey district court initially failed to conclude what the Second
Circuit and the London Film court promptly decided—that the forum in which the plaintiff filed suit was likely the most convenient
forum for the parties involved, especially when the court could properly exercise general personal jurisdiction.
C. Using Foreign Law to Prevent Copyright Infringement
With the United States’ ratification of the Berne Convention and
subsequent cases holding jurisdiction and application of foreign law
proper over foreign copyright infringements, copyright owners have
increased the number of tools they can use in seeking to curb reverse
engineering of copyrighted software and other infringing copyright
violations. By affording non-nationals the same protection as nationals, the Berne Convention helps prevent infringements to the extent
the country’s domestic law provides for copyright protections. Still, if
the country’s laws grant less protection than U.S. copyright laws, the
party seeking protection will not be at any advantage because of the
Convention.
A large limitation in the law exists when the foreign country’s
laws do not provide protection equivalent to that of the United
States. This problem is further exacerbated by the difficulties of litigating in a distant forum. Alternatively, obtaining jurisdiction in the
United States may serve purposes of convenience, but the choice of
law will still be the same. For example, if the foreign jurisdiction’s
law provides for reverse engineering, litigating in the United States
will have no effect because no copyright rules will be violated, as the
foreign jurisdiction’s laws allow the conduct. Applying a less restrictive foreign law in the United States obviously will not make the foreign law afford protections equivalent to U.S. law. Litigating in the
United States, however, will likely provide a friendlier court to a domestic party seeking enforcement of its copyright and seeking retribution for infringements occurring abroad.
V. CONCLUSION
The territorial limitations of U.S. law place dangerous limitations
on the application of copyright law to infringements occurring
abroad. Certain tools currently exist to indirectly combat foreign
copyright infringements. Nevertheless, these tools do not provide
sufficient protections when the courts can exercise personal jurisdic1310
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tion but cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the infringing activity due to territorial limitations. Some courts have sought to
expansively treat the “authorization” language of section 106 to enable a finding of subject matter jurisdiction over the infringement,
even though the underlying direct infringement does not occur domestically. Allowing a cause of action based on section 106’s “authorization” language better serves to protect the United States’ interests in its nationals’ intellectual property than does the current
policy of the Ninth Circuit, which requires a finding of an underlying
act of domestic infringement. As the Curb court remarked, “[i]n a
global marketplace, it is literally a distinction without a difference.”151

Brandon Dalling

151. Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
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